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DEFINING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND
WOMEN’S AUTONOMY IN LAW
Gopika Solanki & Geetanjali Gangoli*
This paper explores the complex relationship between Indian feminism and the 
law and legal systems, as reflected in the recent (2015) Bombay High Court 
judgment on domestic violence.  It is divided into two sections. The first section 
looks at feminist interventions in marital disputes and domestic violence through 
grassroots efforts, and outlines the multidimensional and hybrid feminist 
understandings of  domestic violence, discusses change strategies and ethical 
principles that underpinned their action, and addresses the enactment of  the 
Protection of  Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (PWDVA) as one 
such strategy against domestic violence. This section also focuses on feminist 
dilemmas and foregrounds the issue of  women’s autonomy in situations of  
domestic violence. The mainstreaming of  feminist legal interventions through the 
PWDVA has brought new challenges for feminists and the second section 
discusses this issue by focusing on judicial intervention in deciding the boundary 
of  counselling and mediation practices by protection officers under the 
PWDVA. We suggest that as seen in the 2015 judgement, while the judiciary 
has upheld some aspects of  feminist practice and disallowed reconciliation in 
situations of  serious physical domestic violence, its over-emphasis on equating 
physical violence with domestic violence and its protectionist stance has limited 
women’s autonomy and gone against feminist counselling principles and politics 
undergirding feminist interventions in situations of  domestic violence. We 
suggest that this judgment can be read as a dialogue within a section of  feminist 
groups in India who endorse feminist political ideals of  liberty, individual rights, 
and equality and seek to institutionalize these within the law. This paper is an 
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analytical and interpretive piece and not an empirical inquiry into legal practice 
or a survey of  case law developments of  the PWDVA. It focuses on normative 
questions of  theoretical and policy relevance arising from feminist engagements 
with law.
I. INTRODUCTION
The recent Bombay High Court (HC) judgment  on domestic violence 
brings to the fore the complex relationship between Indian feminism and the 
law and legal systems. Since the 1980s, feminists have engaged in multiple 
strategies on domestic violence—for example, outreach and support work for 
women experiencing domestic violence, which included counselling and refuge 
provision, legal aid, and campaigning on legal reforms.   This judgment can be 
read as a dialogue within a section of  feminist groups in India who endorse 
feminist political ideals of  liberty, individual rights, and equality and seek to 
institutionalize these within the PWDVA. 
The judgment emerged from a petition by  academic institutions, women’s 
groups, and activists (Jaya Sagade and the Indian Law Society (ILS) Law College, 
Pune, Lawyers Collective, Majlis Legal Centre for Women, Tata Institute of  
Social Sciences, Bharatiya Stree Shakti and Stree Mukti Sanghatana) to make 
recommendations for the effective implementation of  the PWDVA, including 
challenging the circular in Maharashtra that prohibited pre-litigation “joint 
counselling” of  husband and wife in domestic violence cases without a court 
order. The judgment quashed this circular, and also directed that there should be 
no joint counselling/mediation in cases of  “serious” physical domestic violence. 
These cases must be brought to the court for protection and relief  prior to joint 
1
2
1 See, Dr. Jaya Sagade, Director v. The State of  Maharashtra (In the High Court of  Judicature 
at Bombay, Suo Motu Public Interest Litigation No. 104 of   2015/SOM.PIL.104/2015-
DB).
2 Geetanjali Gangoli and Martin Rew, Strategic Co-option IndianFeminists, the State and Legal 
Activism on Domestic Violence, in UNDERSTANDING GENDER BASED VIOLENCE: NATIONAL 
AND INTERNATIONAL CONTEXTS, ROUTLEDGE STUDIES IN CRIME AND SOCIETY 
(2015); Gopika Solanki, Beyond the Limitations of  an Impasse: Feminism, Multiculturalism, and 
Legal Reforms in Religious Family Laws, 40(1) POLITIKON: SOUTH AFRICAN JOURNAL OF 
POLITICAL STUDIES, 83–111 (2013); Gopika Solanki, A Court of  her own: Autonomy, Gender, 
and Women’s Courts in India, in GENDER EQUALITY AND JUSTICE IN FAMILY LAW 
DISPUTES: WOMEN, MEDIATION AND RELIGIOUS ARBITRATION, (B Samia and J Pierce, 
eds., forthcoming 2016).
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counselling. In all other cases, the non-governmental organizations (NGOs), 
counsellors, or the police are directed that they may undertake counselling, 
including joint counselling/mediation, and that the “dispute” may be settled 
“amicably either by reconciliation or amicable separation.”
Before entering into these debates, we will provide a short summary of  
the domestic violence law and feminist interventions, challenges, and reflections 
on this issue. This paper is divided into two sections. The first section begins 
with the background of  feminist interventions in marital disputes and domestic 
violence through grassroots efforts. This section outlines the multidimensional 
understanding of  domestic violence that feminists arrived at through their work, 
discusses change in strategies and ethical principles that underpinned their 
action. This section also focuses on feminist dilemmas and foregrounds the 
issue of  women’s autonomy in situations of  domestic violence as one such 
instance. The section explains why autonomous feminist groups privileged 
women’s autonomy in countering domestic violence while recognising that 
structural inequalities could inhibit the exercise of  freedom. The feminists also 
attempted to address domestic violence through collective action from bottom 
up and the enactment of  the PWDVA is one such strategy. The PWDVA is one 
of  the feminist attempts to institutionalise their indigenously evolved 
counselling principles and mediation practices as part of  their intervention in 
redressal of  domestic violence. The mainstreaming of  feminist legal 
interventions through the PWDVA has brought new challenges for feminists 
and the second section discusses this issue by focusing on judicial intervention in 
deciding the boundary of  counselling and mediation practices by protection 
officers under the PWDVA. We suggest that while the judiciary has upheld some 
aspects of  feminist practice and disallowed reconciliation in situations of  serious 
physical domestic violence, its over-emphasis on equating physical violence with 
domestic violence and its protectionist stance has limited women’s autonomy 
and gone against feminist counselling principles and politics undergirding 
feminist interventions in situations of  domestic violence.  
In terms of  methods, this paper is an analytical and interpretive piece and 
not an empirical inquiry into legal practice or a survey of  case law developments 
of  the PWDVA. This paper is also not meant to be an example of  evidence-
based and positivist law-making through adjudication. It focuses on normative 
questions of  theoretical and policy relevance arising from feminist engagements 
with law. 
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II. THE BACKDROP: WOMEN’S MOVEMENTS IN INDIA
Internationally, women’s issues gained global prominence with the 
declaration of  the period 1975–1985 as the United Nations Decade for Women. 
In India, the State responded by commissioning a report on the status of  
women to a group of  feminist researchers and activists, which acknowledged 
that women in India suffered from a range of  structural inequalities and 
injustices.   This was the period when the “autonomous” women’s movement in 
India properly emerged, where some groups and certain individuals decided to 
leave left wing political parties and signify their autonomy from the State, both 
of  which were patriarchal and restrictive in their view.   Feminist groups worked 
closely with other social movements working against poverty, corruption, caste, 
and class, but unlike in the West,   in India there has been no serious discussion 
of  a feminist separatist State.   The nascent feminist groups emerging in the late 
1970s and early 1980s focused primarily on the issues of  police and State-
initiated violence against women. The first major campaign of  the women’s 
movement was to protest against the role of  the judiciary in condoning the rape 
of  a tribal girl, Mathura, by a group of  policemen in a police station in 1978. As a 
feminist activist reflected, “[we] were interested in issues of  class, but we were 
clearly distinct from left-wing party organizations. For us, we saw that patriarchy 
would still exist in a socialist State, while for left-wing party women’s 
activists…they thought we should wait for the [socialist] revolution until 
patriarchy could be tackled.”   Indeed, the groups themselves had a distinct class 
base. For example, in the early 1980s, members of  the feminist group Forum 
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3 Phulrenu Guha, et al, Towards Equality, Report of  the Committee on the Status of  Women in 
India, Government of  India, New Delhi (1974); Shirin Rai and Shraddha Chigateri, 
Emerging State Feminism in India: A Conversation with Vina Mazumdar, Member Secretary to the 
First Committee on the Status of  Women in India, 9(1) INTERNATIONAL FEMINIST JOURNAL OF 
POLITICS, 104–111 (2007).
4 Vijay Agnew, The West in Feminist Debate: Discourse and Practice, 20(1) WOMEN’S STUDIES 
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL, 3–19 (1997).
5 Catharine A. MacKinnon, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE (1989).
6 We refer here to debates such as those put forward by authors such as Roxanne Dunbar-
Ortiz who have argued for and through the radical feminist group Cell 16, advising women 
to separate from those men who were not actively working towards the emancipation of  
women from patriarchal power.
7 Considering field note entries and discussions with three feminist movement activists in 
Mumbai in November 2001.
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Against Rape (later called Forum Against Oppression of  Women (“FAOW”)) 
identified themselves as an ad-hoc body, predominantly made up of  women 
who had “cosmopolitan values, and were well informed about Western 
liberation movements.”   While the FAOW began primarily as a movement to 
publicise and fight against sexual violence against women, FAOW as a group has 
also since campaigned on issues ranging from the rights of  sexual minorities to 
domestic and sexual violence. 
Equally, Indian feminists were also challenged by feminists from minority 
communities, who suggested that “mainstream” feminism was upper-caste 
Hindu in its orientation, and that it did not address the issues of  minority 
women.   This led to the formation of  organizations such as Awaaz-e-Niswaan 
(Voice of  Women) formed in Mumbai in 1987 in a predominantly Muslim-
dominated area.  Current feminist activism in India has also adopted the 
Internet as a key forum, including online campaigns against sexual harassment, 
such as The Blank Noise Project,  and the Pink Chaddi Campaign (or Pink 
Underwear Campaign) that grew from a Facebook website protesting against 
fundamentalist control over women, and feminist e-groups such as Feminists 
India. The Indian feminist movement, therefore, is a hybrid and uses a range of  
tactics to address different forms of  violence against women.
III. FEMINIST INTERVENTIONS AND QUESTIONS SURROUNDING 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND FEMINIST COUNSELLING
The Indian women’s movements (consisting of  autonomous feminist 
collectives, agitational groups, grassroots organizations, political fronts of  
parties, women’s wings of  trade unions, counselling centres, and NGOs in 
8
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8 Vibhuti, Sujata, and Padma, The Anti Rape Movement in India in THIRD WORLD, SECOND 
SEX: WOMEN’S STRUGGLES AND NATIONAL LIBERATION, 180–190 (M. Davis, ed., 1983).
9 Moving...But Not Quite There—Evaluation Report of  One Decade 1980–1990, FORUM AGAINST 
OPPRESSION OF WOMEN, BOMBAY (1990); Kumkum Sangari, Politics of  Diversity: Religious 
Communities and Multiple Patriarchies, 30(51) ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLY, 
3787–3810 (1995).
10 Nivedita Menon, RECOVERING SUBVERSION: FEMINIST POLITICS BEYOND THE 
LAW(2004).
11 Trishima Mitra-Kahn, Offline Issues, Online Lives? The Emerging Cyberlife of  Feminist Politics in 
Urban India, in SOUTH ASIAN FEMINISMS: POLITICS AND POSSIBILITIES (Srila Roy, ed., 
2013).
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Mumbai) emerged in the 1970s and spread to urban and rural areas.   Arguing 
that women’s movements in India are embedded in political environments of  
Indian federalism, Raka Ray pointed out that women’s groups in Calcutta were 
more likely to be embedded in the political culture of  the Communist Party of  
India (Marxist) that ruled the State and exercised considerable ideological 
influence.   These groups therefore organized around issues such as women’s 
literacy, discrimination in wage employment, access to public resources, and 
addressing the “practical interests” of  women, arising from concrete conditions 
of  material and ideational realities of  women.   On the other hand, embedded 
in a politically heterogeneous political environment of  Mumbai and exposed to 
multiple ideological and material influences, women’s groups in Mumbai were 
more likely to organize around issues affecting women’s “strategic interests,” 
rooted in gender subordination and entailing strategic goal of  emancipation of  
women from gender and other hierarchies,   taking up issues of  violence against 
women, female foeticide, religious fundamentalism, and sexual harassment at 
the workplace.   Legal reforms and everyday engagements with the law have 
been a focus of  women’s groups in Mumbai,   and feminist groups have built a 
formal and informal network of  contacts with the police, the courts (especially 
the Family Court), and social welfare departments, in addition to academic 
institutions, journalists, lawyers, filmmakers, and other human rights and legal 
organizations and communist parties. As a result, there is a constant exchange of  
ideas across these networks.
The issue of  violence against women—especially domestic 
violence—remains an enduring concern for the women’s movements in 
Mumbai. The women’s groups in Mumbai responded to this issue by 
establishing collective and grassroots organizations that provided feminist 
counselling and mediation, and established feminist shelters. For instance, 
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12 Geetanjali Gangoli, INDIAN FEMINISMS: LAW, PATRIARCHY AND VIOLENCE IN INDIA 
(2007).
13 Raka Ray, FIELDS OF PROTEST: WOMEN’S MOVEMENTS IN INDIA (1999). 
14 Maxine Molyneux, Mobilization without Emancipation? Women’s interests, the State, and Revolution 
in Nicaragua, 11(2) FEMINIST STUDIES, 227–254 (1985).
15 Id.
16 Raka Ray, supra note 13.
17 Gangoli 2007, supra note 12.
18 Gopika Solanki, ADJUDICATION IN RELIGIOUS FAMILY LAWS: CULTURAL 
ACCOMMODATION, LEGAL PLURALISM, AND GENDER EQUALITY IN INDIA (2011).
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groups such as the Forum Against Oppression of  Women formed a feminist 
crisis and counselling centre in 1981, called the Women’s Centre, as did groups 
such as the Stree Mukti Sanghatana, Swadhar and later, the Awaaz-e-Niswaan. 
They have also experimented in developing organizational models that can 
address the issue of  violence against women. For instance, feminists from 
academic institution such as the Tata Institute of  Social Sciences(TISS) and the 
Mumbai police created Special Cells for Women and Children in selected police 
stations in Mumbai in order to respond to the needs and interests of  women 
who approach the police for help in cases of  violence against women.   These 
experiments have been institutionalized in the PWDVA. 
This paper is based on this section of  the Indian feminist movements’ 
ideological preconceptions, beliefs, and assumptions regarding the feminist 
practice of  intervention in family disputes that are underlined by key concerns 
within liberalism such as rights, justice, equality, and autonomy. This section of  
feminists who were part of  autonomous women’s groups since 1970s have held 
these concepts as central to feminist counselling and integrated them into 
feminist practice. This is not to discount the fact that these views may not be 
shared across Indian feminist movements and there are feminist groups whose 
practice may not mirror these liberal values. This paper however is limited to the 
discussion of  this case in the light of  feminist debates within secular and 
humanist organizations.
IV. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, FEMINIST DILEMMAS, AND REFLECTIONS
Since their early days, these feminist organizations confronted these two 
core questions: What should the nature of  feminist intervention be in cases of  
domestic violence? What kind of  political and ethical principles might undergird 
this form of  intervention? The feminist groups, through their grassroots-level 
work, activism, and experiences of  legal campaigns have arrived at a political 
understanding of  domestic violence and have developed ethical principles that 
govern their intervention in cases of  domestic violence against women. For 
instance, these organizations, through their praxis, see domestic violence as a 
continuum between mental and physical violence. Second, women’s groups see a 
link between episodic violence that women experience with routine violence 
19
20
19 Anjali Dave and Gopika Solanki, Journey from Violence to Crime: a Study of  Domestic Violence in 
the City of  Mumbai, TATA INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES, MUMBAI (2001).
20 Solanki 2013, supra note 2.
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embedded in the structure of  marriage and material and other inequalities. 
Furthermore, while laws addressing domestic violence focused on marital 
violence, these groups along with other women’s movements sought to address 
the issue of  violence against single women alongside violence in intimate 
relations; they were also the first groups to address violence against lesbians and 
transgender persons.  In addition, their intervention is local and contextual. 
Indian feminist centres offer a variety of  services, ranging from counselling to 
arbitration, mediation, and adjudication in religious family laws. They also 
provide emotional support to women; build counter-hegemonic spaces; enable 
women to join legal and other feminist campaigns; help them access shelter, 
medical services, and legal aid; intervene with their immediate and extended 
families, neighbourhoods, caste and sect councils, community leaders, and 
members (including religious organizations and groups); and often arrange for 
employment and other support through informal networks.
These women’s groups have also developed certain ethical principles 
around feminist counselling, which came from their own experiences of  
addressing domestic and sexual violence against women. For instance, they 
believe that domestic violence is a product of  structural inequality against 
women, and this power imbalance carries over into counselling; therefore, they 
advocate a pro-woman approach in their work. This does not make them 
susceptible to their political certitudes but enables them to offer counselling that 
listens to all sides yet addresses the question of  gender hierarchy in and through 
their counselling.  The first step in their counselling practice is to believe the 
woman and believe in the woman; in other words, they begin with the premise 
that women are able to make autonomous choices and that their task is to 
facilitate this process.
Feminists groups recognized since the 1980s that women who approached 
them for help faced both material and legal constraints that left few options of  
exit for women. For instance, women across ethnicity, caste, religion, and class 
faced specific legal constraints in postcolonial India, and many of  these continue 
to persist in the contemporary laws and legal system. The feminists found that 
maintenance amounts granted to women were low and difficult to obtain despite 
21
22
23
24
21 Solanki 2013, supra note 2.
22 Solanki 2011, supra note 18; Solanki forthcoming, supra note 2.
23 Solanki forthcoming, supra note 2.
24 Solanki forthcoming, supra note 2.
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court orders. The legal battle was lengthy, cumbersome, and expensive for most 
women. Many women were unable to support their children economically but 
were the primary caregivers who were concerned about their children’s safety, 
well-being, and care. In addition, women who complained of  violence were 
thrown out of  homes and thus faced a problem of  shelter; also, during 
negotiations, gender-based economic inequality, unequal inheritance rights, and 
lack of  employment opportunities skewed the power in favour of  men.
Minority women were also at risk from religious fundamentalism and 
communal violence.   Single women faced the loss of  social status and were 
especially vulnerable to sexual harassment from family members and neighbours 
as well as from other men, as they were perceived to be without the protection 
of  a man. These constraints needed to be featured into feminist negotiations, 
bargaining, and interventions while working on individual cases. In addition, 
feminists also realized that ideological beliefs in the sanctity of  marriage and 
social recognition of  marriage were also internalized by some women and played 
a role in many women’s decisions to reconcile with their husbands and families.
Feminist philosophers have debated this issue and have used Isaiah 
Berlin’s account of  two concepts of  liberty as central to their discourse. In his 
famous essay, “Two Conceptions of  Liberty,” Berlin articulates the concepts of  
“negative” and “positive” liberty.   For Berlin, negative liberty is linked to an 
absence of  external constraints such as law, physical force, and coercion from 
external sources. In this conception, the subject recognizes her desires that are 
seen as coming out of  an internal process, but is unable to pursue them due to 
external circumstances and thus establishes a distinction between external 
constraints and internal subjectivity. The concept of  positive liberty, on the 
other hand, focuses on internal barriers (such as addictions, fears, immediate 
desires) that can be qualitatively evaluated, and that can limit freedom and the 
ability to realize our self-authored projects. Feminists have pointed out that 
freedom is denied to women, minorities, and to the poor and more vulnerable 
populations whose lives are structured by external constraints.   However, the 
theoretical approach of  positive liberty represents yet another difficulty for 
25
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27
28
25 Solanki forthcoming, supra note 2.
28 Diana Coole, WOMEN IN POLITICAL THEORY: FROM ANCIENT MISOGYNY TO 
CONTEMPORARY FEMINISM (1993).
26 Solanki 2011, supra note 18.
27 Isaiah Berlin, FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY (1971).
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women. Given that patriarchy is socially constructed and is embedded in 
language, conceptual and epistemological categories that enable us to make 
sense of  the world—and in social rules, customs, and laws that restrict women’s 
choices and freedoms—women’s lives have also become constituted by their 
subservience to men and the denial of  their humanity. Using this discussion to 
illustrate the question of  why women might choose to go back to families where 
they face violence, feminist philosopher Nancy Hirschmann suggested the need 
for a feminist conception of  freedom that expands the conception of  negative 
liberty by adding a realistic account of  gendered and other intersectional 
constraints that women face and by creating imaginative possibilities for the 
exercise of  positive liberty through collective feminist action.
Over the years, therefore, feminist scholars have engaged with these 
dilemmas at several levels. Some have criticized these ideas as masculinist 
conceptions that are rooted in individualistic conceptions of  self-governing 
individuals;  others have stressed that the removal of  negative barriers is a 
necessary condition to visualize feminist freedom,   and yet others have argued 
to decouple notions of  feminist agency from the emancipatory potential of  
conceptions of  freedom.   Other feminist philosophers have developed notions 
of  feminist freedom that place centrality in notions of  choice and agency, but 
deeply anchor agency in material and ideological contexts and relationships.  
Additionally, they place a great emphasis on collective action as a means to 
politically and epistemologically challenge patriarchy and provide the new means 
to change and rebuild lives and communities of  women.
29
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29 Nancy Hirschmann, Domestic Violence and the Theoretical Discourse of  Freedom, 16(1) JOURNAL 
OF WOMEN’S STUDIES, 126–151 (1996).
30 Carol Gilligan, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN’S 
DEVELOPMENT (1982).
31 Marina Oshana, PERSONAL AUTONOMY IN SOCIETY (2006).
32 Saba Mahmood, POLITICS OF PIETY: THE ISLAMIC REVIVAL AND THE FEMINIST 
SUBJECT (2005).
33 Jennifer Nedelsky, LAW’S RELATIONS: A RELATIONAL THEORY OF SELF, AUTONOMY 
AND LAW (2011).
34 Patricia Hill Collins, BLACK FEMINIST THOUGHT: KNOWLEDGE, CONSCIOUSNESS AND 
THE POLITICS OF EMPOWERMENT (1990); Nancy Harstock, MONEY, SEX, AND POWER: 
TOWARDS A FEMINIST HISTORICAL MATERIALISM (1985).
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Often a distinction is made between “serious” physical violence and other 
forms of  abuse. Following Stark,  we postulate that such a distinction is not only 
erroneous but is actually dangerous. Stark had critiqued the way in which 
domestic violence is conceptualized in US law essentially as being episodic and 
incident based, rather than address the patterns of  power and control or what he 
terms “coercive control.” Stark points out that while the domestic violence 
model focuses on intermittent acts of  physical violence against women, it has 
failed to reduce assaults and homicides because it does not address the systemic 
causes of  violence, or the structural roots of  women’s vulnerability:
The domestic violence revolution is stalled and 
the interventions it has spawned are largely 
ineffective because it has failed to come to grips 
with coercive control, a pattern of  liberty harms 
that is several orders of  magnitude more 
devastating than the traditional forms of  
domestic violence current laws, policies, and 
programs are designed to manage. 
A more recent body of  literature has moved away from a narrow 
definition of  agency and opened it up to ethical action and decisions that may 
not be considered agentic at first glance; it has considered the relationship 
between agency and freedom, arguing that while material, ideological, and 
discursive conditions can be determining, socially enacted agentic possibilities 
are always possible.
V. RESPONDING TO THESE QUESTIONS: FEMINIST INTERVENTIONS, 
ACTIONS, AND CHALLENGES
Autonomous feminist collectives and groups in Mumbai and elsewhere in 
India debated issues around agency and intervention intensely in the 1980s and 
arrived at certain political understandings that shaped their feminist principles 
of  intervention in marital disputes and violence within the family. Indeed, these 
journeys of  individual women and feminist organizations in Mumbai have been 
35
36
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35 Evan Stark, COERCIVE CONTROL: HOW MEN ENTRAP WOMEN IN PERSONAL LIFE 
(2007).
36 Id, at 397.
37 Carisa Showden, CHOICES WOMEN MAKE: AGENCY IN DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, ASSISTED 
REPRODUCTION, AND SEX WORK (2011).
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effectively documented.  These feminist organizations privileged a liberal 
approach to autonomy and saw their intervention stemming from the centrality 
of  liberal conceptions of  autonomy, freedom, and equality. They developed a 
nuanced understanding of  domestic violence through praxis. For instance, 
feminists did not see women’s choices to return to situations of  domestic 
violence as a sign of  individual pathology, but as a result of  material contexts 
and social meanings of  marriage. They also learned not to categorize a woman’s 
actions when faced with domestic violence into a logic of  all or nothing. Indeed, 
they acknowledged that a woman’s decision to approach women’s organizations 
when faced with violence was, in itself, an act of  autonomy and ought to be 
respected as such. Feminist activists learned that the first step in feminist 
intervention was to listen to women and be their interlocutors as they developed 
options for women. Second, feminist groups aimed to provide women-centred 
spaces, thus creating an environment and support that enhanced women’s 
capacity to reflect and arrive at decisions about their lives; they aimed to increase 
their normative competence,  by challenging patriarchal assumptions about 
marriage and family during counselling by providing access to possibilities of  
imagining lives without violence.  However, after much debate, feminists also 
recognized that women may not always choose options that align with ideas and 
goals of  feminist organizations. Women’s groups resisted the idea that this was a 
sign of  women’s false consciousness or that women were dupes of  patriarchy. 
However, they recognized that women often make decisions to go back to the 
home where they faced violence. They also recognized, that women may go back 
and forth, and that women on average may go through numerous attempts at 
reconciliation before making up their minds. Indeed, Mumbai feminist groups in 
the 1980s arrived at a conclusion—not without moral and political 
apprehensions—that they recognized women faced enormous material and 
ideological constraints when confronted with domestic violence. In the face of  
these constraints, individual women may choose to go back to their families and 
that the feminist groups would respect the agency of  women to take these 
38
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40
38 Flavia Agnes, MY STORY…OUR STORY: OF REBUILDING BROKEN LIVES (1984); Nandita 
Gandhi and Nandita Shah, The Issues at Stake: Theory and Practice in the Contemporary Women’s 
Movement in India, KALI FOR WOMEN, NEW DELHI (1992); Gangoli 2007, supra note 12; 
Solanki forthcoming, supra note 2.
39 Paul Benson, Autonomy and Oppressive Socialization, 17(3) SOCIAL THEORY AND PRACTICE, 
385–408 (1991).
40 Solanki forthcoming, supra note 2.
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decisions. Feminists recognized that such decisions could negatively affect 
women’s lives. However, they also recognized that to make choices for 
women—and to impose feminist choices on women—would be paternalistic, an 
admission that women were mere instruments of  patriarchy, incapable of  taking 
control of  their lives, and that such a conclusion would be antithetical to 
feminist political, ethical, and epistemological goals, understanding, and action.  
These insights and dilemmas raised an immediate question regarding 
intervention: What should the nature of  feminist intervention be under such 
circumstances? As an answer to this question, feminist organizations opted to 
increase women’s bargaining power every time they effected reconciliation, and 
have devised multiple redressal strategies over time.   For instance, women’s 
groups follow certain procedures when a woman decides to go back to a family 
context that is violent. They go over the dangers of  such a decision with women: 
they remind them that violence may continue, that their step of  reporting of  
violence can, at times, lead to more retaliatory violence if  they go back, and that 
this option may be a dangerous one for them. Should women still persist in 
making these choices, feminist groups once again remind women of  legal 
options, ask them to lodge a complaint at the nearby police station, and to call 
them every time there is an episode of  violence. The feminist groups also put 
them in touch with local women in the neighbourhood or local organizations 
that may be of  help when faced with violence; the groups often hold meetings 
with neighbours and urge them to intervene, and they reassure women that the 
doors of  their organizations are always open to them anytime.   Indeed, these 
women’s organizations placed some of  these strategies before the Bombay HC 
when they argued that these groups should draft a written agreement between 
the two parties of  domestic violence to require men to guarantee that they will 
not violate the women again if  they choose to go back to their marital family; 
these documents have evidentiary use. Indeed, these feminist strategies (which 
were first developed in feminist collectives and autonomous organizations) 
spread to women’s courts and NGOs, community groups,  and to women’s 
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programs such as the Mahila Samakhya (education for women’s equality).
Second, feminists realized that when faced with violence, women may 
make choices that go against their advice, experience, and political leanings. 
However, privileging women’s autonomy remained critical to their interventions 
and this remained woven into their interventions. For instance, during their 
counselling, the organization would always guarantee that their doors would be 
open to any woman at any time and at any point, and this included women who 
appeared to act against expert advice and experience of  these organizations. 
They would stress in their interventions, time and again, that women had the 
choice of  terminating their relationship with the feminist group and/or picking 
it up at any time. Various feminist organizations and groups also realized that 
women, when faced with marital disputes and violence, often talked to every 
organization and individual that they felt might be able to help. Feminist groups, 
however, saw a woman forum-shopping among various organizations as her 
right, even if  these groups were stretched for resources and time. 
Working in individual cases and building organizations and programs has 
been one aspect of  the Indian Women’s Movements’ intervention in domestic 
violence—their aim has been to expand the possibility of  freedom from 
domestic violence through collective action.  Indeed, this petition by the 
women’s groups and human rights organization in the Bombay HC is evidence 
of  ongoing feminist attempts at interventions in law. From the 1980s, Indian 
women’s movements have consistently engaged with legal reforms and with 
institutions in state and society to make justice accessible for women. They 
lobbied for more family courts, women’s police stations, and women’s policy 
machinery; built alliances with the police and the judiciary; devised programs to 
diffuse and communicate feminist ideas and experiences; and often monitored 
police and judicial inaction in matters related to family law.  Feminists also 
experimented with creating alternative institutional structures—for instance, the 
feminist social workers in Bombay (based at TISS, an academic institution), 
established the Special Cell for Women and Children, an institutional hybrid that 
housed this feminist organization within the Bombay police, thereby drawing on 
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the police’s resources while retaining autonomy by locating itself  within the 
interstices of  a university to address cases of  violence against women. This 
experiment also provided the ideal model for developing the administrative 
infrastructure envisaged under the new PWDVA.  
The experience of  feminist hybrid intervention in cases of  domestic 
violence has also been scaled up through its institutionalization by state 
governments’ educational program such as the women’s courts in the Mahila 
Samakhya Programme in Gujarat,  and in women’s courts run by the NGOs. 
This notion of  women’s failure to live up to liberal expectations of  challenging 
domestic violence by walking out on marriage and seemingly submitting to 
family ideology is echoed in some accounts. In addition, similar accounts of  
women’s organizations’ intervention in handling cases of  marital disputes and 
domestic violence have been understood as “bargaining with patriarchy,” such 
accounts fail to connect the interrelationship between feminist collective action 
and individual interventions.  In contrast, women’s groups have seen their 
activism beyond this framework and see their work as ultimately 
transformative.  
VI. CARRYING THESE DEBATES IN LAW
The previous section sketched feminist autonomous groups’ 
interventions in addressing domestic violence. Various aspects of  feminist 
policy goals have been mainstreamed into the PWDVA. Opinions within 
feminist groups and the state vary over the effectiveness of  this feminist 
transplantation of  small scale feminist counselling and mediation practices into 
the state-led implementation of  the PWDVA. Recently, the Bombay HC 
intervened in this debate and this section of  the paper captures these 
developments. We believe this judgment raises very valid issues of  women’s 
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autonomy in experiences of  domestic violence and abuse, and the vexed 
question of  who may provide feminist counselling and/or mediation. We are 
concerned about the primacy given to “serious” physical violence, raised by the 
judgment, and explore these issues in the light of  debates covered in section one.
Domestic Violence Law
The PWDVA was a direct consequence of  feminist intervention and 
engagement, and the role of  women’s organizations in drafting the Act has been 
noted.  The Lawyers Collective claims the 2005 bill as being a “landmark 
victory,” and its website points to its close working relationship with the State:  
Following the inclusion of  the domestic violence 
bill as a priority…we were invited to a series of  
discussions on the proposed bill with the 
Secretary and members of  the Department of  
Women and Child.…The introduction of  the Bill 
in the Parliament was preceded by presentations 
made by Lawyers Collective Women’s Right 
Initiative (LCWRI) along with several prominent 
women’s groups and a full-fledged campaign to 
create awareness on the need for this law. The 
campaign…was started in 1998 by LCWRI with 
several women’s groups from across the country. 
While India had criminalized domestic violence against married women as 
mental and physical “cruelty” as early as 1983, women’s groups were rightly 
concerned that this had not benefitted women due to its focus on physical, 
rather than mental, violence; and its bias towards dowry-related murders and 
violence in implementation. The low conviction rate exacerbated this issue.   
The PWDVA had a broad definition of  domestic violence, which included all 
types of  family relationships (such as domestic violence against men, and 
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between women), and extended to women and men in “live-in relationships.” It 
also included in its scope sexual violence, enabling married women some relief  
in cases of  marital rape (although marital rape continues to not be recognized as 
a criminal offence under the Indian Penal Code). The PWDVA moved away 
from criminalization and included civil protection for women in violent 
relationships, including the right to matrimonial property, and provided for 
injunctions. 
The PWDVA was also based on what has been termed a “convergent 
model”  between a Protection Officer (PO), a new post, who would help 
women approach the courts and other services. Much of  these emerged from 
indigenous feminist models, such as the Special Cell for Women.
The salient features of  the PWDVA are as follows:
• The Act seeks to cover those women who are or have been in a 
relationship with the abuser where both parties have lived together in a 
shared household and are related by consanguinity, marriage or a 
relationship in the nature of  marriage, or adoption; in addition, 
relationship with family members living together as a joint family are also 
included. Even those women who are sisters, widows, mothers, single 
women, or living with them are entitled to get legal protection under the 
proposed Act.
• “Domestic violence” includes actual abuse or the threat of  abuse that is 
physical, sexual, verbal, emotional, and economic. This includes dowry-
related violence.
• The Act secures a married woman’s right to secure housing in cases of  
domestic violence. The Act provides for the woman’s right to reside in the 
matrimonial or shared household, whether or not she has any title or 
rights in the household. This right is secured by a residence order, which is 
passed by a court. 
• The Act empowers the court to pass protection orders that prevent the 
abuser from aiding or committing an act of  domestic violence or any 
other specified act, entering a workplace or any other place frequented by 
the abused, attempting to communicate with the abused, isolating any 
assets used by both the parties, and causing violence to the abused, her 
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relatives, and others who provide her assistance from the domestic 
violence.
• The Act provides for appointment of  POs and NGOs to provide 
assistance to the woman with regard to medical examination, legal aid, 
safe shelter, and so forth.
• The Act provides for breach of  protection order or interim protection 
order by the respondent as a cognizable and non-bailable offence 
punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year, 
or with a fine that may extend to twenty thousand rupees, or with both. 
Similarly, non-compliance or discharge of  duties by the PO is also sought 
to be made an offence under the Act with similar punishment.
There have been concerns that the PWDVA, while excellent in its 
formulation, faced many problems of  implementation and interpretation. In a 
judgment in 2007,   it was stated that there was no evidence that the respondent 
was suffering domestic violence, because the respondent had left her marital 
home and was perceived as not behaving in a traditional manner towards her 
husband and his extended family. In this case, judicial views often reflected 
popular gender perceptions, which may support Menon’s assertion that feminist 
engagement with the law cannot fundamentally change the legal understanding 
of  how the category “woman” is constructed in law.   Further, there were valid 
concerns raised by women’s groups that there were gaps in support services for 
women experiencing domestic violence. Research done by the authors,   
indicates the lack of  refuge provision specifically meeting the needs of  women 
experiencing or escaping domestic violence, and the solution by state 
governments has been to offer “counselling” and/or mediation by a number of  
state and non-state actors.  As stated in the first section of  the paper, we have 
found that feminist NGOs offer a qualitatively different form of  counselling, 
based more on women’s agency than, for example, the police or community-
based organizations, which may veer more towards mediation or reconciliation. 
Here, it is important to note that the terms counselling and mediation are seen as 
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synonymous in the 2015 judgment, yet they may have very different meanings in 
practice. 
The feminist model of  counselling and intervention is institutionalized in 
the PWDVA. However, its critics point out that although the feminist model 
continues to be effective, it has failed once it was institutionalized within the 
state through the PWDVA and scaled up. It is suggested that counsellors coerce 
women into reconciling with violent partners and husbands (even in cases of  
extreme violence) and the law works to reinforce patriarchy and violence; and 
has failed as a tool to protect and empower women.
These debates have been revived in a recent case in Bombay HC, and this 
section discusses the same. Following this worldview that pre-litigation 
counselling by service providers under the PWDVA harms women’s interests 
and persuades them to reconcile despite violence, the Department of  Women 
and Child Development, Maharashtra state issued a circular titled AG/312/2014 
on 24 July, 2014, with regard to counselling/mediation under the PWDVA. The 
circular circumscribed and limited the ambit of  protection agencies: it states that 
such agencies are only allowed to inform the aggrieved woman of  her rights, to 
help her access medical services and shelter homes, and to enable her to file a 
case as an independent litigant or through a PO. Furthermore, the circular 
directed the outside agencies to carry out counselling or mediation only after the 
case is filed in the court and after the court directs these agencies to perform 
these tasks. 
This circular was challenged by a Public Interest Litigation filed by Dr. 
Jaya Sagade of  the Women’s Studies Centre, ILS, Pune, and other co-petitioners 
(including TISS, the Bharatiya Stree Shakti, the Stree Mukti Sanghatana, Majlis 
Manch, and the Lawyers Collective) who placed their experiences of  working as 
protection agencies before the court. They argued that the circular violated 
Articles 14 and 21 of  the Constitution, being arbitrary and discriminatory in 
nature. The co-petitioners argued that the opposite conditions prevailed when it 
came to the implementation of  this Act on the ground. They suggested that 
while the Act explicitly provides for counselling services for preventing violence 
against women using feminist counselling; in practice, once filed, cases were 
referred to mediation judges for mediation, and counsellors’ services were 
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underutilized. Therefore, the issue before the Bombay HC in this matter was 
whether pre-litigation counselling was within the legal ambit of  the PWDVA. 
The law cannot limit a woman’s freedom in terms of  who and when she can 
approach for any type of  counselling and/or mediation. Further, in our opinion, 
this circular was aiming to swallow the autonomy of  the very organizations that 
brought the legislation into existence in the first place.
VII. SUMMARY OF THE JUDGMENT
The following three questions were addressed by the Court: Do service 
providers have the power to provide counselling or is their role limited to giving 
information to applicants who approach them and direct them to other services? 
Does pre-litigation counselling fall within the scope of  the PWDVA? Should any 
form of  counselling commence only after a case has been filed in the court?  
In light of  these questions, the Court held that counsellors are legitimate 
actors within the ambit of  the Act, and to limit the remit of  their authority 
would be to restrict the scope of  the Act. The judge stated that the PWDVA 
mandates pre-litigation counselling. The court opined that a circular that limits 
feminist counselling to information exchange or referral service, reduces pre-
litigation intervention to a clerical exercise. This circular also exposes women to 
the vagaries of  litigation, harms women’s interests by denying them access to 
pre-litigation counselling (when they need it the most), does not fit into the spirit 
of  the Act (which aims to protect and empower women), and is not consistent 
with the Convention on the Elimination of  Discrimination against Women 
(CEDAW). The judge acknowledged that there are various informal counselling 
forums in society, and that they would not fall within the purview of  the court 
order. However, to deny women access to counselling when they are reporting 
violence might adversely affect their interests and be discriminatory compared 
to other women who do not face violence, yet can access counselling in face of  
matrimonial dispute. The Court reiterated that each woman who faces violence 
should have access to pre-litigation counselling, and that there is no breach of  
the PWDVA if  a woman is counselled about her options.
The Court acknowledged the position of  the Maharashtra state that pre-
litigation counselling may be lengthy and may not achieve the desired outcome. 
The lapse of  time before negotiations in such cases would adversely affect 
women’s interests and, therefore, rules might be framed so that as soon as a 
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woman files an application under Section 10 of  the Act, the magistrate should 
pass an interim and pre-interim order that addresses her immediate needs (such 
as maintenance, custody, and residence). However, the magistrate also 
recognized that there is nothing in the Act that suggests the order would only be 
in the favour of  the woman; therefore, the magistrate recognized that the 
circular violated the spirit of  the PWDVA. 
The Court recognized the state’s concern that women are often faced to 
compromise in police stations when they wish to file criminal cases under 
Section 498A of  the Indian Penal Code; similarly, the Court acknowledged that 
counsellors can also persuade women to reconcile, and reiterated that women’s 
choices must be foregrounded in any joint counselling sessions and that women 
should not be advised to reconcile against their wish. While the Court 
acknowledged that the police do not refer clients to POs under the PWDVA and 
that they coerce women into reconciliation, it also suggested that bad practice 
cannot be a substitute for good law.  
The Court acknowledged that many women do not wish to turn to the 
law; they may make these choices due to structural constraints and personal 
wishes and that they should have the freedom of  choice. The state should 
provide legal rights and make services available so that they can access them 
when they wish to make that choice. The Court held that a woman desiring to be 
counselled should not be propelled into litigation against her wish. 
The Court took seriously the question that pre-litigation counselling may 
result in an amicable separation, but should it result in a negotiated settlement? 
Some women may not wish to pursue a legal case following such a settlement. 
The Court recognized that in such cases, future litigation would be an open 
option and a failed settlement would be important evidence in favour of  the 
woman under Section 12 of  the PWDVA. In view of  the arguments that judicial 
arbitration in cases of  domestic violence harms the interests of  women, the 
Court held that having counsellors who may be sensitive to issues of  power 
inequality during counselling would not enforce a settlement in favour of  
women—a violation of  her legal and human rights.  
The Court accepted that the practice in the Indian context is a hybrid, and 
a combination of  counselling, mediation, and arbitration is used under various 
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Acts governing marital and other disputes in India. In this context, it is difficult 
to argue that the provision of  counselling and mediation envisaged under the 
PWDVA is against the spirit of  the law. 
It was also argued by women’s groups and activists that the reporting of  
domestic violence has increased due to this provision and that counsellors are 
the first port of  call; they provide crucial emotional support, use risk assessment 
and management strategies, and provide a safe, neutral, non-judgmental space 
for women to negotiate a non-violent outcome. The service providers pointed 
out that a range of  remedial options are open to women when they approach 
these counsellors with their problems, not all are urgent (some women want 
maintenance while others may want the right to residence) and pre-litigation 
counselling can address these needs.  
The Court recognized that domestic violence is an anathema and that no 
woman facing physical violence can be counselled to settle or reside with a 
husband by any counsellor or service provider; this would pose a risk to women’s 
lives. The Court stated that counsellors and the police should be trained so that 
they do not reconcile partners in cases of  physical violence; and in such cases, a 
domestic incident report (DIR) should be filed under Section 12 of  the 
PWDVA. In such cases, any further intervention would be countenanced only 
after the protective court order is obtained. The Court took on board a 
suggestion by the Lawyers Collective that such an order might be obtained as 
soon as the woman consents to counselling; this would constitute a record of  
domestic violence, and pre-litigation counselling would be the answer when a 
woman needs maintenance or a separate residence. All such counselling should 
take place within the required ethical framework, upholding the spirit of  the 
legislation.  
The Court quashed the circular of  the Maharashtra state, as itwas found to 
be discriminatory, arbitrary, and unusual. The judgment walks a fine line between 
the two feminist positions. The judge held that any woman who has faced 
violence as defined under the PWDVA, can access counselling and other 
services provided under the Act. However, the Court also specified that care 
should be taken to ensure that the woman is informed about her options, that 
joint counselling with the husband or other parties should commence after 
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obtaining her voluntary and informed consent, and that she should not be 
pressured during joint counselling. The Court ruled that pre-litigation mediation 
is allowed in other matrimonial disputes involving no violence, and guided that 
any settlement should be in writing, clearly stating “Terms of  Settlement,” and 
that any service provider, at their discretion, may file a DIR under Section 10 of  
the PWDVA. However, it also specified that no joint counselling should be 
undertaken in case of  serious physical domestic violence. The DIR under 
Section 10(2) of  the Act should be automatically filed in all such cases.  
VIII.  DISCUSSION
This section interweaves the two sections of  this paper. We find that the 
judge has attempted to balance the two contrasting positions and ruled in the 
interests of  women. However, the judgment raises certain key issues for feminist 
theory, practice, and legal interventions. 
Moving Away from the Ideology of  Traditional Marriage
Feminist commentators have commonly interpreted the state’s apparent 
concern to protect women from domestic violence as motivated by a real 
concern to preserve the status of  the traditional heterosexual, nuclear family.  
However, the Bombay HC judgment does not fit into this trend. Justice Dalvi 
referred to the possibility that the social context views marital reconciliation and 
affective family ties as an important aspect of  social harmony. She concluded, 
therefore, that women who face violence have to be treated with sensitivity. She 
also added that women who have been violated cannot be coerced into 
settlement or reconciliation with the husband or family members. 
Violence as a Continuum     
However, the Court makes an unhelpful distinction between physical and 
other forms of  domestic violence. For instance, it stated that physical violence is 
an anathema to civilized society and that violence is dangerous, but the judgment 
fails to recognize that a woman’s prolonged exposure to oppressive, malicious, 
vicious, callous conduct can lead to mental anguish and be a danger to the quality 
of  life. For e.g., it can cause mental stress and result in loss of  self  and self-
esteem. The judgement does not recognize that mental violence—through 
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confinement, bullying, coercion, and financial and emotional distress can be as 
detrimental to a woman’s well-being as physical abuse and years of  mental 
violence can lead someone to take her own life. Second, the Court made a 
distinction between episodic and routine forms of  violence, and did not 
interconnect the two. As seen above, Stark’s conceptualization of  coercive 
control looked at how women are trapped within an abusive relationship—not 
because of  individual acts of  physical abuse, but because of  the ways in which 
men entrap women through intimidation, isolation, and control, which is 
legitimized through law and society. Men use tactics such as limiting women’s 
resources, isolating them, and undermining their privacy and autonomy. Stark 
suggests that violence in abusive relationships is ongoing rather than episodic, 
that its effects are cumulative rather than incident-specific and abused victims 
can be entrapped even when the assault is not present: 
Coercive control may be defined as an ongoing 
pattern of  domination by which male abusive 
partners primarily interweave repeated physical 
and sexual violence with intimidation, sexual 
degradation, isolation and control. The primary 
outcome of  coercive control is a condition of  
entrapment that can be hostage-like in the harms 
it inflicts on dignity, liberty, autonomy and 
personhood as well as to physical and 
psychological integrity. 
The coercive control model certainly has resonances in the way that 
women experience domestic violence and abuse in the Indian context. The 
judgment could have gone further in recognizing this aspect of  domestic 
violence. 
Additionally, there are issues of  post-separation violence that should be 
acknowledged. This remains a neglected area in the body of  literature on 
domestic violence in India. Research in the United Kingdom and the United 
States has pointed to the increased risk of  violence and abuse women face when 
they may decide to leave a violent and abusive partner. For instance, in the 
United States, 75% of  the three American women murdered every day by an 
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intimate partner are killed within hours, days, or weeks after attempting to flee 
their abuser.
Thiara and Gill’s excellent study  on the experiences of  black and 
minority ethnic women in the United Kingdom’s experiences of  post-separation 
abuse found that it was a significant issue for the majority of  women studied, 
even in cases where separation had taken place years before. The research also 
found that for South Asian women, the joint family system, and pressures from 
extended families exacerbated these experiences. The South Asian family system 
often used other family members to pressure women into returning, or forcing 
contact with children. In most of  these cases, children either witnessed post-
separation violence, or were aware of  the threat of  such violence, and men used 
child contact or children in order to control, intimidate, and undermine women, 
and made it difficult for women to “move on.”
In India, women continue to experience post-separation abuse from 
partners and extended marital families, and this may be complicated by the 
absence of  natal support and welfare provision.   This void of  support makes it 
harder for women to consider leaving the abusive partner, and may also 
contribute to women returning to violent partners and their families.
The Question of  Agency
The Bombay HC has also decided against feminist understandings that 
harmonize freedom and survival. For instance, while the Maharashtra 
government’s circular refused to recognize the backdrop of  feminist action that 
has shaped this law, the HC has not been adequately cognisant of  feminist 
dilemmas of  freedom and autonomy. Unlike feminist groups, the HC has 
decided to draw a line regulating the nature and extent of  women’s autonomy. 
The HC has made an assumption that women who face physical violence may 
61
62
63
Defining Domestic Violence and Women’s Autonomy in Law
75
61 Post-Separation Abuse in Domestic Violence Cases: Out of  the Frying Pan of  Domestic Abuse and into 
the Fires of  DV Homicide, Infanticide, and Child Sexual Abuse, SPIRITUAL ALLIANCE TO STOP 
INTIMATE VIOLENCE (2014) available at http://saiv.org/post-separation-abuse-in-
domestic-violence-cases (Last visited 20 April 2016).
62 Ravi Thiara and Aisha Gill, Domestic Violence, Child Contact and Post-Separation Violence Issues for 
South Asian and African-Caribbean Women and Children: a Report of  Findings (The University of  
Warwick, NSPCC, and the University of  Roehampton), available at https://www. 
nspcc.org.uk/globalassets/documents/research-reports/domestic-violence-child-contact-
post-separation-violence-report.pdf  (2012).
63 Solanki 2011, supra note 18; Solanki forthcoming, supra note 2.
not have the right to decide whether they wish to file an application in the HC or 
not, which has reinforced patriarchal paternalism by failing to believe that 
women are capable of  making choices and respecting their choices. 
Furthermore, this case raises a very important concern that feminist politics 
when institutionalized through laws such as the PWDVA, may lose its meaning, 
particularly when these interventions depend on state governments and 
machinery for their implementation. The judgment is sensitive to this issue. 
However, the HC’s decision to deny women agency will not provide a solution to 
this challenge of  working with the state that feminists face. The judgment 
sidesteps this question by stipulating that women can be autonomous in making 
decisions about marital disputes, and women who face physical domestic 
violence should be under the paternalistic care of  the state. The Maharashtra 
government seemed to suggest that women face the danger of  loss of  life in 
such conditions and, therefore, the state’s decision is justifiable. This position 
raises two issues. First, data supporting either side of  the debate is lacking—no 
studies in the Indian context examines whether women who are murdered due 
to domestic violence in the past were reconciled by state agencies or not. 
Second, such cases may not help women who might be compelled to commit 
suicide as a result of  mental torture. This paternalistic approach of  the judiciary, 
therefore, may not help women. 
The judgment does not correspond to women’s experiences and the 
structural constraints that they endure. The following vignette based on 
fieldwork conducted in Mumbai in December 2015 illustrates this point.   A 
Hindu woman approached the Bharatiya Muslim Mahila Andolan (“BMMA”) 
with her three children. She had been beaten by her husband; she lived in a 
nearby slum where the BMMA office is located. She ran into the office; her face 
was swollen and she had a cut on her forehead after an incident of  domestic 
violence that morning. While narrating what had happened that morning, she 
also told the group that she faced sexual violence and she feared that her 
husband might be abusing her younger children, a boy and a girl, behind her 
back. They lived in a rental room near her elder brother-in-law and sister-in-law’s 
room in the slum. Her husband did not work; she worked as a domestic worker 
and was forced to leave her children alone when she went out to work. The 
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group asked her if  she had ever complained to the police. She said that she had 
gone to file a non-cognizable offense but her husband would run away every 
time the police approached; the police would try to catch him but soon gave up. 
As a result, he had never been brought before the police. The BMMA activists, 
after providing her with medical aid, went to her room to speak to the husband; 
as usual, he ran away. A couple of  hours later, Maya rang the BMMA office and 
said that he was back in their dwelling. The BMMA activists went to her house a 
second time, but the husband again ran away. The activists called their contacts 
in the slum and an hour later, the contacts told them where he was hiding. Five 
activists caught him and went to the police station. They had a joint meeting 
with the husband, his family, the wife, the police officer in charge, and the 
BMMA activists.  
The BMMA activists asked the woman what she wanted to do. The police 
officer in charge informed her of  her rights, said that he was willing to file a 
criminal case, and would refer her case so that she could also file under the 
PWDVA. In addition, he was willing to investigate and file a case under 
Protection of  Children against Sexual Offenses Act, 2012 that criminalises 
sexual violence against children. While the police is often lax and patriarchal in 
their general response to domestic violence, the individual police officer herein 
was cooperative, perhaps because of  the activists’ presence and pressure. The 
activists and the police informed the woman and her husband about their rights 
and the consequences of  filing a case. The husband’s parents told the police that 
they would send the husband to the village and that they and his elder brother 
would take financial responsibility of  the maintenance for the woman and 
children. However, they would not do so if  she filed a civil or criminal case 
against her husband. Maya decided to try this solution; the BMMA activists 
asked her if  she was sure, and pointed out that it was not the best decision. Maya 
said that she agreed with the BMMA activists that her husband might come back 
from the village, the violence may continue, and that the husband’s family might 
renege on their promises. However, she said: “I am an orphan; this is my second 
marriage. If  I don’t take up this option, I’ll be on the street with my children and 
every other man will prey on our vulnerability and abuse us.”   The PWDVA 
could help her secure a room, but the economic support in this case would have 
to come from her parents-in-law and elder brother-in-law. Antagonizing her in-
laws was not useful to Maya in the short run or in the long run. As Maya said, 
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“My elder brother-in-law and sister-in-law help us in every way—I can leave my 
children with them when I go to work; they are our neighbours and support us, 
give us food and medicines in times of  need—I have to feed and educate these 
children—how do we survive without them?”   In Maya’s case, the threat of  
police action and the intervention of  the BMMA gave her some temporary 
relief, and the case will continue at the BMMA and in other forums. Indeed, the 
BMMA activists deliberated with Maya and her elder sister-in-law what her 
options might be; in the coming years, perhaps they could ask her parents-in-law 
for a share in their property in Maya’s name or in the children’s name with Maya 
as a guardian. The idea of  sending the children away to study in a residential 
school was also discussed; the safety and protection of  very young children in 
the face of  few options remain an ongoing concern for feminists and other 
activists. This case demonstrates the harsh realities of  women’s lives, where 
choices are between various sub-optimal options and no guarantees of  lives free 
of  violence. The feminist challenges and efforts have been to expand the 
possibilities under these conditions. Therefore, although the judgment is 
sympathetic to women in its recognition of  the dangers women face in cases of  
domestic violence, its paternalism denies women autonomy in ways that would 
harm women. As this illustration shows, in many instances (including in such 
cases of  poverty, violence, and deprivation), this judgment is not enabling for 
women.   
Access to Counselling
The judgment, however, retains the distinction between pre-litigation and 
during-litigation counselling for women who have faced severe physical 
violence. In the context of  family mediation, feminist scholars have pointed out 
that far from empowering women, the family mediation process acts against 
women’s interests; such mediation diminishes the importance of  context, 
downplays the importance of  rights, undermines the ability to hold a party 
accountable for his actions, and focuses on formal, rather than substantive, 
equality.   Conversely, others have pointed out that such arguments ignore the 
continuation of  power imbalances during litigation, and tend to assume that the 
systems work, that court orders are followed, that there are no delays in the court 
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process—these also underestimate the husband’s capacity to pay back. Medsen 
cautions against taking an “all or nothing” approach when faced with domestic 
violence—not all types of  violence are the same and may impact victims 
differently; thus, these nuances need to be taken into account.
Similarly, there is no substantive evidence in the Indian context that 
women do better in court than in pre-litigation counselling. In many cases, 
violence does not cease during litigation—in some, it increases. For instance, in 
cases of  marital disputes, women litigants in Family Court in Mumbai 
complained of  increased surveillance and intimidation from their husbands, 
reported husbands harassing them by throwing garbage in their houses, sending 
local goons to intimidate women or their family members and support networks, 
causing scenes at women’s workplaces and harassing their fellow workers and 
employers, threatening them or tricking them into discontinuing the cases.   
Thus, the asymmetry of  power and gender intertwined with class and other axes 
of  identity become part of  pre-litigation counselling as well as counselling under 
the supervision of  the court. Second, as the court agreed, the violation of  pre-
litigation counselling terms can provide additional evidence to prove domestic 
violence and serve as evidence in order to secure maintenance to the wife. In 
addition, the Maharashtra state establishes a line between counsellors who, in 
their opinion, pressure women into reconciliation despite violence, but the State 
does not recognize how lawyers and judges may do so as well. Lawyers hold 
mixed views regarding any counselling, even during the court process. Some see 
it as a way to extend a dispute; others see it as a relief  when they are unprepared; 
some see it as a legal strategy; others find it useful when they recognize that the 
opposite party may drop the case out of  fatigue. In many cases, lawyers 
informally counsel their clients to reconcile, proudly declaring that “we are not 
home-breakers— we advise clients to reconcile even when it goes against our 
interests.”   In general, many women litigants have reported that they do not 
trust their lawyers, and find them expensive and unreliable. Some have also 
reported sexual harassment from lawyers and talked of  lawyers violating legal 
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aid norms.   The Maharashtra government’s circular privileged the lawyers’ role 
and reduced the social workers’ role; it is unclear how this would help women 
litigants. It is equally unclear how women litigants who face violence would 
benefit from being helped by an initial contact with lawyers rather than with pre-
litigation counsellors.      
IX. CONCLUSIONS
The 2015 judgment breaks new ground in that it does not reaffirm the 
preservation of  marriage and social harmony as a key goal of  counselling. It also 
demonstrates sensitivity to the challenges faced by women in domestic violence 
situations. It acknowledges the role played by the Indian women’s movements in 
offering support to women. However, in case of  serious physical violence, the 
court has adopted a paternalistic position, limiting the autonomy of  women, and 
has reinforced the stereotype of  women as patriarchal stooges.
We have argued elsewhere that feminist responses to violence against 
women are hybrid in nature.   Other than legal reform, some feminists provide 
legal aid and counselling to domestic violence victims (although this may be 
done in an indirect way through creative ‘mis’-use of  the law as a bargaining 
tool); others avoid engagement with the State through outreach and refuge 
provisions or women’s councils to adjudicate on cases of  gender-based violence. 
The Indian women’s movement has always adopted multiple strategies, but it is 
also important to note that women experiencing domestic abuse and violence 
use multiple strategies, too; often concurrently, but sometimes in a more linear 
fashion. Women may use family courts, the police, women’s organizations, and 
caste panchayats as different strategies to get justice or relief.   While the legal 
arena remains a significant avenue for many women—especially those who 
throng the courts in search of  justice—other strategies may feed into and 
empower women further.
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